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Abstract Estate agency which has been researched upon particularly in the UK, US and Asia is still in its infancy in Nigeria. This 
research aims at discovering the impact of different agency types in the efficiency of Nigeria real estate practice. The study of 159 Estate 
Surveying firms and 91 Property development companies in the commercial nerve centre of the country (Lagos) representing both agents 
and principal (vendor/purchasers) respectively, indicates that multiple agency is mostly adopted in Nigeria real estate practice. The 
Relative Important Index coupled with Chi-Square test at 0.05 level of significance supports the posit of  certain inefficiencies synonymous 
with multiple agency as discovered in an earlier work carried out in the UK. The researchers thereby advocated the modification of sub-
agency practice particularly to involve the consent and commitment of principals so as to eradicate all inefficiencies by safeguarding the 
interest of all parties. A call for focus on the neglected real estate agency research among Nigeria researchers is also advocated.     
 
Keywords: Agency, Agent, Principal, Real Estate, Efficiency, Nigeria  
 
 
1.  Introduction  
 
Agency is described as a relationship existing between a principal and an agent, where an agent is 
given rights of authorization from the former to act on his behalf. Such relationship could be 
established when principals are convinced that the involvement of agents will produce more 
effective returns usually due to their vantage in training, commitment and conversance in the 
prescribed endeavour. Hence, it can be arguable that its application is in various spheres of life as 
most of life endevours could be centred on business.  
 In real estate practice, where the market is fraught with dearth of information, the role of 
the estate agent cannot be overemphasized particularly in bringing together parties of divergent 
interest in attaining specific goals. The practice of real estate agency has been certified by various 
nations around the globe. For instance, in the UK where most laws governing the operational 
laws in Nigeria are fashioned from, estate agency practice is controlled by the Estate Agents Act 
1979 as amended by legislation such as the Consumer, Estate Agents and Redress Act 2007. The 
practice of Estate Agency in the UK has transcended from the highly fragmented industry to 
more robust practice. In the 1970s, small, locally based, independent businesses dominated the 
industry. This industry structure meant that estate agency was seen as a typical entrepreneurial 
activity. By the first half of the 1990s, however, most estate agencies were in the hands of large 
institutions in the financial services sector (Boyle, 1998); independent estate agents who have 
begun to reappear on the high street recently has characterized the industry by differentiation 
strategies where small firms wishing to establish a long-term position in a market need to assess 
both the market environment and the market position of their rivals, the larger firms (Bishop 
and Megicks, 2002).  
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 In Nigeria, Section 25&26 of Decree 24 of 1975 empowers the Estate Surveyor and 
Valuer in carrying out operations as an estate agent. The organized body recognized for the 
regulation of practice is the Estate Surveyors and valuers Registration Board of Nigeria 
(ESVARBON). However, the Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC), body statutorily 
empowered for registration of every business outfit in the country, regards estate agency as a 
business concern and classifies it under general business practice (Akomolede, 2006; Oni, 2009). 
This has partly accounted for why non-professionals engage in estate agency. The agency 
practice is regarded as an all comers’ affairs as lawyers, engineers, accountants and even laymen 
learned in numeric details carry out this operation. An expression has become synonymous with 
the estate surveying profession calling every other profession dabbling into agency as quarks. 
However, there are no clear cut-out edicts granting the estate surveyor and valuer the exclusive 
preserve of operation even when series of protest has been made to that effect.    
 For no clearly defined reason, two principal different types of agency for property 
disposal have developed. No matter the form agency practice takes, it usually revolves around 
any of the two major types. “Sole agency” as a method of operating in the property market 
means that only one agent is appointed to act for the vendor and “Multiple agency” or “mixed 
agency” has been used to describe the practice, where vendors may instruct more than one 
agent, and often several, each to act independently of the other(s), with only the successful agent 
receiving the commission. The Monopolies Commission (1969) published their report which 
found that estate agency practice in Britain, although not regular, revealed that the north of a line 
drawn roughly from the Wash to the Bristol Channel, generally practiced sole agency as the 
accepted method of operation while the South of the line, had multiple agency practice as the 
general rule.   
 Another prominent type of real estate agency is “Joint agency”, which refers to the 
method of operation when two agents agree to market the vendor’s property together and split 
the commission. The use of “sub-agency” is spelt out in Decree 24 of 1975, where agents are to 
be co-opted by the main agent and have their fees based on the commission given to the main 
agent.  Nevertheless, it can be arguable that sub agency can be submerge into sole agency while 
joint agency is a variant of multiple agency.  
 A different agency practice system is adopted in the USA where the agency relationship 
between agent and seller is formalized in the listing contract and there are several types of listing 
arrangements. Under an open listing (similar to multiple agency in the UK), the seller can list the 
property with multiple agents and is liable to pay commission only to the agent that procures the 
sale. The seller does not pay any commission if he finds the buyer himself. Under exclusive 
agency listing, the contracting agent shall be the only (exclusive) agent that will be entitled to a 
commission and no other agent will have a direct contractual relationship with the seller. The 
seller alone may sell the property without incurring liability to pay the contracting broker. These 
two contracts are now rarely used in residential markets in the USA under multiple listing 
services (MLSs) system (Miceli, 1988). The most common listing arrangement is exclusive-right-
to-sell contract, which entitles the contractual agent to compensation regardless of who sells the 
property, including owner or other agents.  
 The individual agent who is usually more important than the firm he represents when 
considered for engagement in agency practice by clients’ (Johnson et al., 1988) could have 
preference for the adoption of any of the various agency type. In the UK, Ke, Jayne and Isaac 
(2009) confirmed that the estate agents with a sole agency practice charge a lower agency fee, 
help clients to achieve better selling price and are more efficient; whereas multiple agency 
practice facilitates liquidity in the housing market, but experiences higher fall-through rate. 
However, a look at the various advantages and disadvantages of the two major types of estate 
agency as specified by Stephens (1981) will assist in the approach to adopt.  
 The advantages of sole agency practice are as follows: It eliminates much abortive work, 
reduces costs, and encourages agents to charge commission at a lower rate. It creates a better and 
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more professional relationship between vendor and agent, in that it imposes on that agent an 
obligation to use his best endeavors to carry out his instructions and removes from him any 
temptation there may be to give anything other than the soundest possible advice. In buoyant 
market conditions it minimizes the tendency on the part of vendors to “gazump”. Disadvantages 
could be considered as follows:  The time taken by a sole agent to conclude a sale may be longer. 
In the multiple agency areas, the agent receiving instructions knows that it is the vendor’s 
intention to instruct other agents, thus the agent would ensure that the property details or 
particulars will be sent to prospective purchasers as quickly as possible. The sole agent would be 
more able to put such work off. . Although the sole agents will recognize their duty to obtain the 
maximum possible price for their client, that client only has one agent’s judgment of value on 
which to rely. However, multiple agency also has advantages. The vendor instructing more than 
one agent will obtain greater exposure, because no one agent will be in contact with all 
prospective purchasers in his area. From a purchaser’s viewpoint, a visit to any one agent is likely 
to give him, if not a comprehensive list of the properties available in that area, at least a fuller 
one than he would probably get if sole agency was the generally accepted practice in that region. 
Against this, multiple agency practice generates abortive work and cost. The agent may be 
reluctant to spend money on promoting a sale if he knows that his money might be wasted, 
should another agent find a buyer first and so get the commission.  
 Research on estate agency particularly ones that relate to the operation of the various 
types has been sparse. However, authors in this field of research have made immense 
contributions. The impact of contract types on agent performance and the relation of time on 
market and selling price together with the complexity between listing price and time on market 
was a highlight of research conducted in the US (Rutherford et al., 2001, 2004; Asabere et al., 
1996; Arnold, 1999; Yavas and Yang, 1995). Agency, which is also described as brokerage 
service, has been studied in real estate in relation to the impact of broker intermediation on 
selling price and duration, Jud (1983), Jud and Frew (1986), Jud, Seaks, and Winkler (1996), 
Zumpano, Elder, and Baryla (1996), Elder, Zumpano, and Baryla (1999, 2000), Rutherford, 
Springer, and Yavas (2005), Huang and Rutherford (2007), Rutherford, Springer, and Yavas 
(2007), and Turnbull and Dombrow (2007).  
 The need for training of agents was established in the research carried out by (Munneke 
and Yavas, 2001; Allen, Faircloth, Forgery, and Rutherford, 2003; Johnson, Zumpano, and 
Anderson, 2008). The researchers discovered that differences among brokerage firms and or 
their agents suggest the possibility that some homes sell at premium prices and over a shorter 
time horizon than is the case with other broker-assisted transactions handled by less skilled or 
motivated agents. Hence, buyers and sellers may not be indifferent with respect to their choice 
or use of salespeople which might prompt them to seek out ways to identify the more skilled and 
more highly motivated agents. Property developers in Singapore have been found to assess the 
strengths of marketing agents before appointing them, while the latter also flaunt their strengths 
in order to secure agency jobs (Pheng and Hoe, 1994). One way to enhance the operation of 
agents is in the area of improved information technology as this has been proven to increase the 
competitive advantages inducing more collaboration and market innovations as evident in 
Beijing (Ling and Wang, 2006). There are also evidences of the integrated use of the internet to 
enhance service delivery in the UK as Portals are use to provide content in the form of 
information, advice and news, links to other businesses including individual estate agency chains, 
search facilities, and opportunities for registration which support personalization of 
communication with customers (Rowley, 2005). However, Ke, Isaac and Dalton (2008) attribute 
the performance of estate agency to market environment volatility such as market uncertainty, 
housing market liquidity and house price changes. The authors discovered that the firm factors 
such as firm size and the level of agency fee have no explanatory power in explaining business 
performance.   
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 There is dearth in literature pertaining to real estate agency in Nigeria. This is in contrast 
to the vast level of publication in cognate areas in the real estate discipline such as valuation, 
property/portfolio management, land administration, real estate taxation amongst others. This 
cannot be said to be unconnected with the unprofessional nature in which the task of estate 
agency is viewed by almost every estate surveyor and valuer in the country.   
Even though literature has classified the practice of real estate agency into two major types 
namely sole and multiple; from pre-research investigation four types of agency practice namely 
sole, sub, joint and multiple agency could be said to exist in the Nigeria property market (Eze, 
1999). The researcher intends to explore this area of research in a bid to ascertaining the 
efficiency the adoption of various types of estate agency have on real estate  practice in the 
country. 
 
2.  Research Methods 
 
The study focused on Lagos metropolis due to its vibrant property market (being the undisputed 
commercial capital of the country). The respondents representing agents are Estate Surveyors 
and Valuers,. The Directory of the Nigerian Institution of Estate Surveyors and Valuers, 
(NIESV, 2009) reveals that almost 50% of the head offices of all of Nigeria’s Valuation firms are 
located in that metropolis. The research focused on Estate Surveyors and Valuers as the study 
populations who are major intermediary in real estate agency.  Out of the 270 firms in the study 
area, the use of a demographic formula by Otte (2006) resulted to a total of 159 Estate Surveying 
firm representing about 59% of the sample frame was calculated as an appropriate sample size 
for this study. This represented the total number of questionnaires issued for the study.  
 The second study group comprises of property developers. This focus group is relevant 
in that they fulfill a dual role as vendors and purchasers of real estate. They could be described as 
principals that engage the agent. Property developers are usually categorized into two main 
categories, namely: private (individual) investors and organizations or corporate investors 
(Harvey, 1987; Hargitay and Yu, 1993; Isaac, 1998; Cadman and Rosalyn, 1998 and Hoesli and 
Macgregor, 2000). The private developers are very numerous as every potential property owner 
could be regarded as a property developer. For this reason, they are not subject to a sample 
frame. Moreover, they are difficult to reach since most of them do not subscribe to developers’ 
associations. This means that it would be difficult to get a sample frame, of developers. For this 
reason, private developers are considered an unrealistic study population for this work. On the 
other hand a sample frame of organizational developers could be secured from the recent 
publication of the Association of Housing Corporations in Nigeria (2006). Drawing from this 
list, there are a total of 132 institutional companies /property developers in Lagos Metropolis. 
The adoption of the statistical model described above (Otte, 2006) gives a total of 91 property 
development companies, which forms the sample size of this focus group. This represents 69% 
of the study population, a figure that is not at variance with Nwana’s (1981) 40% minimum 
recommendation. 
 Questions investigated various aspects of market efficiency as evident in literature in a 
somewhat similar study carried out in the UK (Ke, Jayne and Isaac, 2009). Based on the aim of 
this work, questions that centred on the closeness of final selling price to asking price; the speed 
of sale of property; purchase fall through, were enquired. The limitation of Ke, et al., (op. cit), of 
the neglect of principals’ (Vendors and purchasers), was put into consideration in this work. The 
views of respondents were measured in a graded manner, using Likert (ordinal) scales. The data 
were analyzed by means of weighted average frequencies of which hypothesized results were 
tested with Chi-Square at a 0.05 level of significance.  
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3. The Results 
Respondents were found to be mostly between the ages of 31-35 years. The average respondent 
had practical experience spanning about 5 years. The most typical academic qualification of 
respondents was a B.Sc degree (about 67% of respondents). Majority of the respondents were 
eager to respond to the questions presented to them by the researchers as a high response rate 
was recorded. From the agents, the research recorded a high response of about 72.33% of the 
159 respondents in this study amounting to a total of 115 duly completed and retrieved 
questionnaires. The property development companies had a total of 91 questionnaires 
distributed to them with a response rate of 71.43% (65 questionnaires). 
 The first question was to discover the major ways by which agents get appointed based 
on the various types of agency. Table 1 below gives the graphic details from the stance of agents’ 
and principals’ (vendors’ and purchasers’) respectively: 
 
Table 1. Ways by which agents’ are being appointed  
 
Respondents’ Agency  Always Most times Sometimes Rarely Never 
Agent 22 34 21 22 16 
principal 
Sole Agency 
18 21 15 6 5 
Agent 41 36 24 10 4 
Principal 
Sub-Agency 
2 8 12 24 19 
Agent 11 17 37 27 23 
Principal 
Joint Agency 
7 10 21 16 11 




29 13 11 8 4 
 
Source: Authors field survey 2011 
 
The use of the Relative Important Index (RII) indicates that Estate Surveyors and Valuers are 
majorly appointed through multiple agency procedure. Response from Table 1 above indicates 
that vendors/buyers prefer to give instructions for the sale and purchase of properties to so 
many agents. Hence, they are apt in adopting the multiple agency procedure while 
commissioning agents (evident from RII, 3.85). The agents’ also attested to the response from 
principals’ (evident from RII, 3.87), however they also attested that sub-agents of outstanding 
records are usually co-opted not minding the sharing of fees (evident from RII, 3.87). This 
research reveals that most times the business of estate agency is not usually carried out alone 
even though the agents will prefer to have a sole brief. However, the agents most often co-opt or 
are usually co-opted by other agents they are familiar and comfortable to work with even after 
they have been given the brief under the procedure of multiple agency from the principal.  
 The next sets of questions were centred on market efficiency: closeness of final selling 
price to asking price; the speed of sale of property; purchase fall through. Ke, Jayne and Isaac, 
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(2009) buttressed that closeness of final selling price to asking price; and the speed of sale of 
property is a function of efficient market while existence of purchase fall through is an evidence 
of  inefficient property market.  
 
3.1 Closeness of Final Selling Price to Asking Price 
 
Regarding how close the final selling price achieved is to the asking price, it was proven in UK 
(Ke, Jayne and Isaac, 2009) that sole agency is more likely to achieve a higher selling price than 
multiple agency. For the case of the Nigerian context, the respondents were asked the question 
on what agency procedure is likely to achieve the said asking price. Table 2 below gives more 
details:   
 
Table 2. Closeness of Final Selling Price to Asking Price 
 
Respondents’ Agency  Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 




22 19 14 7 3 
Agent 25 34 38 10 8 
Principal 
Sub-Agency 
8 15 22 9 11 




14 17 21 6 5 




9 12 14 11 19 
 
Source: Authors field survey 2011 
Response as evident in Table 2 above reveals that both respondents attest to the fact that the 
adoption of sole agency results to attaining a selling price close to the initial asking price (Agent, 
RII 3.94; Principal, RII 3.77). The researchers hypothesized that there is no significant difference 
between responses from both group of respondents. Based on a 0.05 level of significance with 
the use of Chi-Square, the following was derived from the response on sole agency: 
Chi-Square Formula = ∑(O-E)2 
        E 
 
The degree of freedom = (R-1)(C-1) 
 
Expected rate of frequency for each cell = Subtotal of Column × Subtotal of row 
       Grand total 
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	2 = 1.16,  
Our computed Chi-Square = 1.16 
 
df= 1×4 @ 0.05 level of significance = 9.49 
Since our computed value is less than the critical 	2 value of 9.49, the null hypothesis is accepted. 
Hence; there is no significant difference in the response of both respondents. Thus, the adoption 
of sole agency results to the closeness of selling price to the initial asking price. 
 
3.2 The Speed of Sale of Property 
 
It was established in Ke, Jayne and Isaac, (op. cit.) that multiple agency results to speed in the 
sale of properties. Hence, this work triggered a question to the respondents in that direction. 
Details are revealed in Table 4 below:    
 
Table 3. Speed of sale of property 
 
Respondents’ Agency  Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 




7 18 23 10 7 
Agent 38 28 21 17 11 
Principal 
Sub-Agency 
11 9 14 23 8 




18 13 19 9 6 




29 15 12 5 4 
  
Source: Authors field survey 2011 
The response as revealed from the Table 3 above shows that the adoption of multiple agency 
results to the speed of sale of properties. This is evident from the highest RII of 4.03 and 3.92 
for agents and principal respectively.  However, sole agency inhibits the quick disposal of 
properties, evident from RII of 2.78 and 3.15 for agent and principal respectively being the least 
for the various agency types. The agents also attested that their involvement in sub-agency also 
assist in the quick disposal of properties. In order to determine if any significant difference does 
exist in the response of both respondents on the choice of multiple agency, the researchers posit 
based on a 0.05 level of significance results as follows:  
	2 = 3.33,  
Our computed Chi-Square = 3.33 
 
df= 1×4 @ 0.05 level of significance = 9.49 
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Since our computed value is less than the critical 	2 value of 9.49, the null hypothesis is accepted. 
Hence; there is no significant difference in the response of both respondents. Thus, the adoption 
of multiple agency results to the speed of sale of property.  
 
3.3 Purchase Fall Through 
 
In scenarios where the vendor and/or purchaser can withdraw from the transaction process 
without paying penalty results to what is being described as purchase fall through. Ke, Jayne and 
Isaac, (op. cit.) discovered that the adoption of multiple agency results to high purchase fall 
through. This research sought the outcome in the Nigerian context. Details are presented in 
Table 4 below:  
 
Table 4. Purchase fall through of agency practice 
 
Respondents’ Agency  Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 




8 12 16 21 8 
Agent 29 33 22 16 15 
Principal 
Sub-Agency 
16 14 16 10 9 




12 11 21 14 7 




22 13 18 7 5 
 
 Source: Authors field survey 2011 
The response as revealed from the Table 4 above shows that the adoption of multiple agency 
brings about ‘purchase fall through’ in real estate practice. The RII of 3.8 and 3.46 for agents and 
principal respectively attest to such finds being the largest amongst other agency procedures.  It 
is also revealed that sole agency having the least RII of 2.82 and 2.86 for agent and principal 
respectively, does not encourage ‘purchase fall through’. Again in order to determine if any 
significant difference does exist in the response of both respondents on the choice of multiple 
agency, the researchers posit based on a 0.05 level of significance results as follows:  
 
	2 = 3.5337,  
Our computed Chi-Square = 3.5337 
 
df= 1×4 @ 0.05 level of significance = 9.49 
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Since our computed value is less than the critical 	2 value of 9.49, the null hypothesis is accepted. 
Hence; there is no significant difference in the response of both respondents. Thus, the adoption 
of multiple agency results to purchase fall through.  
 
4.  Recommendation and Concluding Remarks  
 
As revealed from the study, multiple agency, which is being adopted in the country, though aids 
in the speed of transactions, is fraught with certain inefficiencies such as farness of selling price 
from initial asking price; and purchase fall through. Sole agency being the antidote for these 
inefficiencies is seldom practiced in the country. 
         The researchers hereby opine that since the practice of sub-agency is well abreast amongst 
agents, both parties (agents and principals) can use that as a tool to enhance market efficiency. 
Appointment of agents can be as a result of a consortium where a main agent is commissioned 
by the principal whereas such agent is allowed to collaborate with other agents recognized by the 
principal for effective disposal of properties. However, whosoever gets the client can receive the 
greatest commission while every other agent in the link is compensated based on his 
contribution to the marketing/disposal of such property. This should be done to bridge the gap 
between sole and multiple agency and as such give every party involve in real estate transaction a 
stake to be committed to.  
          Although this work has covered the stance from both principal and agent, an 
improvement on Ke, Jayne and Isaac, (op. cit.), where consideration was placed on only agents, it 
could be explained with caution as issues on market efficiency would have been best quantified 
from an observation of the market. However, since the respondents of this work are the major 
players in real estate agency, their response invariably has represented the outcomes in the 
property market. There can be investigations for further research into the effect of agency 
inefficiency on macroeconomic issues such as inflation, interest rate, national income, etc.  
          It is also pertinent to state here that a total neglect of this area of research will not help 
out. When real estate researchers in the country begin to air their voice in real estate agency, the 
war of exclusive dealings in handling this conceived semiprofessional area in real estate practice 
can begin to be won by the estate surveyors and valuers. Hence, this work will go a long way in 
filling a gap in Nigeria real estate literature.  
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